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JURISDICTION STATEMENT

Defendant appealed his denial of a request to end a permanent protective order.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 2, 1999 Appellant entered into plea negotiations with the State whereby
Appellant would ultimately get two criminal cases against him dismissed. (See
Appellant's Addendum D and E.) In exchange for the dismissal, the appellant agreed
that permanent criminal protective orders would enter against him in cases 991800015
and 99 I 800059. The permanent criminal protective order contained the following
unambiguous language: "Based on stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing,
the Court hereby finds that it is necessary to enter a permanent criminal protective order
in this case." (App. Addendum B) (emphasis added). The last paragraph of the order
includes the following language: "Violation of this order may result in a charge of a
Third Degree Felony. Violation of this order may result in immediate incarceration. This
order shall not expire." (Id.) (emphasis added). Appellant filed a motion to have the

criminal protective orders dismissed and a hearing was held on the same on October 27,
2016. (App. Addendum A.) The trial court denied the motion, however, contrary to
Appellant's assertions the trial court specifically held that it had the authority to modify
the order, but chose not to do so. (App. Addendum Cat 2.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Contrary to Appellant's argument, the lower court never found that the protective
order cannot be dismissed. Indeed, the court was adamant that it retained and had
inherent authority to revisit and modify its orders. The court held, however, that absent
extraordinary circumstances, it would not do so, and no extraordinary circumstances were
alleged by Appellant. Appellant failed below to argue the distinction between a criminal
and civil protective order and couched all of his arguments under the assumption that
Utah Code. Ann.§ 78B-7-115 would be controlling. Appellant never raised§ 77-36-5.1
below. Finally, since appellant knowingly stipulated to the permanent order being entered
against him and since he failed to object to not having an evidentiary hearing, he cannot
now complain of due process violations.
Qb

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LOWER COURT NEVER HELD THAT THE PROTECTIVE
ORDER CANNOT BE DISMISSED. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
THAT SUCH A HOLDING IS ERRONEOUS IN LIGHT OF
STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROVIDING FOR SUCH AND IN
LIGHT OF AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN THE PLEA
AGREEMENT ARE ALL BASED ON INCORRECT FACTS.

Appellant's assertion that the lower court held that the criminal protective order
cannot be dismissed is belied by the record and is erroneous. Indeed, at a hearing held
October 27, 2017 the court questioned Appellant about whether the court retained
authority to modify its order in spite of the permanent nature of the language in the order.
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(App. Addendum A at 6.) After listening to Appellant's argument the court made the
following statement:
THE JUDGE: I think what I'm hearing you say is that all this language means is
that the order is an order until the judge changes it.
MR. SAM: Con-ect.
THE JUDGE: But a judge can always change an order.
MR. SAM: Correct, yes.
(Id. at 10.) When the State argued that the court no longer retained the power to modify
its order the lower court was somewhat dismissive of that position:
THE JUDGE: Okay. I was wondering if maybe, you heard me say that, that I
think a judge can never be told that he can't modify an order that
the judge has issued.
(Id. at 21.)
In its oral ruling at the hearing the court specifically stated "Now, I'm adamant
(,:)\

~

that a judge can always modify the order that the judge enters, but judges shouldn't do so
lightly." (Id. at 30.) The court then determined that since the order was a bargained-for
element of the plea negotiation "it should be honored by the court in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. And Mr. Osen has not alleged extraordinary
circumstances." (Id.)
Consistent with the court's ruling at the October 27, 2016 hearing, the courts order
contains the following language: "The Court retains jurisdiction to modify any order
previously issued by the Court, including the Domestic Violence Protective Order, but it
should not do so lightly." (App. Addendum C at 2.) The court was very clear, therefore
3
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that the criminal protective order, while permanent, was something that can be modified
at the court's discretion. All of Appellant's arguments in section I of Appellant's Opening
Brief are based on the factual premise that the court left no way whatsoever for the
criminal protective order to be modified. Since the record makes it clear that that is
simply untrue, Appellant's arguments fail.

II.

APPELLANT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROTECTIVE
ORDERS AND HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY GUIDANCE
AS TO WHICH STANDARD SHOULD BE USED IF A HEARING
WERE TO BE HELD.

In its brief Appellant cites to Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-5.1 which arguably would
cmTently apply to criminal protective orders. However, in all proceedings below,
Appellant made no mention of §77-35-5.1 and only referred to § 78B-7-115. 78B-7-115
clearly applies only to civil protective orders. This fact was acknowledged by counsel and
the lower court both in argument and in the court's oral ruling issued at argument. The
court specifically stated that dismissing the civil protective orders had a pretty clear path
because of the criteria found in §78B-7-115. (App. Addendum A at 29.) The court
acknowledged that the criteria in§ 78B-7-115 could be appropriate guidance for
dismissing a criminal order, but that it would not be controlling. (Id. at 28.)
The court then noted that it wanted to honor the bargain that was reached between
the parties. Although principles of contract law "cannot be blindly incorporated into the
criminal law," they provide "a useful analytical framework in cases involving plea
agreements .... " State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 ,I 13 (internal citations omitted).
4
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The court relied in part on the idea that the parties had the understanding that the criminal
protective order would be permanent in exchange for the substantial benefit of getting
two criminal cases dismissed and that the comi did not think it was appropriate to
interfere with the bargain made between the parties. (App. Addendum A at 30.)
Appellant contends that the State already go its bargain by virtue of the fact that the
defendant agreed to a petmanent protective order, but as noted by the lower comi,
Appellant's interpretation would run against the plain language of the bargain and be
contrary to what the State bargained for in exchange for dismissing two cases.

III.

DEFENDANT NEVER OBJECTED TO A LACK OF HEARING
AND HAS THEREFORE WAIVED ANY CLAIM TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARNG.

In Hedgcock v. Hedgcock, 2009 UT App 304, the Husband of a divorce
proceeding appealed a lower court ruling granting a permanent civil protective order
against him without a hearing. Id. at il I. In affirming the lower court's granting of the
permanent protective order the court noted that, A district court should hold an
evidentiary hearing when it cannot make a determination as to whether a protective order
is appropriate on the face of the pleadings. However, there is nothing that prevents a
party from waiving the right to present evidence at the hearing challenging the protective
order. Id. at il 13. The court went on the note that at several times the husband never
challenged the lack of an evidentiary hearing and the "[h]usband made no objection that
he was denied an evidentiary hearing and made no request to present evidence, either on
that day or at a later date." Id. at ,r 14. The court then affirmed the lower court ruling.
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Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant made no objection on the record to not
having an evidentiary hearing. Indeed, it was the State that seemed more adamant about
the need for a hearing. (See App. Addendum A at 21.) Toward the end of the hearing,
after the court's ruling the court tried to schedule an evidentiary hearing, but Appellant
did not request one. (Id. at 30-31.) Furthermore, when the court announced its ruling, it
explained that Appellant would need to allege extraordinary circumstances for the
criminal order to be dismissed and that Appellant had failed to do so. {Id. at 30.)
Appellant made no effort to object or request the ability to supplement his argument or
brief. (See id.) Consistent with Hedgcock, supra Appellant's failure to object to the lack
of an evidentiary hearing waives his right to the hearing. He cannot now on appeal
complain that he was denied an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Appellant complains that the court's finding that the Criminal Protective Order
can never be dismissed was erroneous. However, the lower court found that it retained
authority to dismiss the order. Furthermore, Appellant never objected to the lack of an
evidentiary hearing and has therefore waived his right to a hearing. Based on the
forgoing, the ruling of the district court should be AFFIRMED.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Brett Keeler, certify that this reply brief complies the type-volume limitation of
Utah R. App. P. 24(:f)( 1) because this brief contains 1,656 words, excluding the parts of
the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24 (f)(l )(B). This brief complies with the
typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a
proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in font size 13 and style Times
New Roman. This reply brief also complies with Rule 21, governing public and private
records.

DATED this _ _ day of November, 2017.

Brett Keeler
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
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